LEGAL ETHICS-

SECURITIES-SECURITIES ATTORNEYS' AFFIRMATIVE

DUTY TO TAKE PROMPT ACTION TO HAVE CLIENTS COMPLY WITH
REQUIREMENTS.
In re Carter, SEC Release No.
34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847.

DISCLOSURE

The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) in In re
Carter1 set forth ethical standards for securities lawyers who counsel
corporate clients on disclosure requirements. 2 The Commission construed the "unethical or improper professional conduct" clause of rule
2(e) of its Rules of Practice 3 to require attorneys, faced with a "strongwilled" management that ignores their disclosure advice, to take
prompt corrective action 4 within the client system-the corporate
entity. 5 Prompt action can include, but is not limited to, bringing the
matter before one or more members of the board of directors, the full
board itself, or other officers or members of management, as well as
resigning.' Failure to take affirmative action can lead to the inference that the attorney has been "co-opted" into a non-disclosure
scheme .7

SEC Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

82,847.

Id. at 84,172. In dissent, Commissioner Evans thought that the Commission should not
have promulgated the standard without first soliciting public opinion. Id. at 84,178 (Evans,
Comm'r, concurring and dissenting). See also Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 7

SEc. REG. L.J. 54, 71 (1979).
3 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1980) provides:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing
or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission
after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the
requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or
integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) to

have willfully violated or aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the
federal securities laws (15 U.S.C. 77a to 80b-20),

or the rules and regulations

thereunder.
Id.
"Practicing before the Commission" is broadly defined to include both the "transact[ion]
[of] any business with the Commission" and "the preparation of any statement, opinion, or other
paper" which forms part of any document filed with the Commission. Id. § 201.2(g).
4 In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)

5 Id. at 84,171.
6 Id. at 84,172.

7 Id.
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82,847, at 84,172.
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The history of rule 2(e) 8 as an enforcement tool" reveals the
evolution of the Commission's policy from self-regulation'0 by the
securities bar to pervasive Commission regulation of the bar." Initially the use of rule 2(e) was limited to practices involving intentional
misconduct.12 Since 1960 the Commission has expanded the scope of
8 Originally promulgated in 1935 as rule II, 1 Fed. Reg. 1,753 (1936), rule 2(e)(l) was
adopted in June 1938 "in substantially similar form to its present-day prescriptions, with the
exception that the subsection of the Rule covering disciplinary actions for willful violations of the
federal securities laws was added in 1971." Miller, supra note 2, at 57.
' Among the Commission's "arsenal of enforcement tools" are "the explicit authority to seek
injunctive relief against securities laws violations (Securities Act of 1933 § 20, and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21); and the foremost enforcement power to refer evidence of securities
laws to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution (Securities Act § 20(b) and Exchange Act
§ 21(e))." Miller, supra note 2, at 55 n.2.
l0 See Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 663 (1964). During the period of self-regulation from 1935 to 1960, primary reliance was placed upon the legal and accounting professions
for the exercise of control and the proposal of reforms. Note, SEC Disciplinary HearingsTouche Ross v. SEC-Rule 2(e) Validated in First Public Proceeding: Uncertainty Ahead for
Securities Practitioners,5 J. Corn'. L. 433, 439 (1980).
Attorneys have historically favored self-regulation and have considered rule 2(e) as
more of a risk factor than the rules of the state or local bar. This is true not only
because the SEC is essentially an enforcement body as opposed to a state bar
disciplinary committee, which in most states is composed of an attorney's peers, who
by nature have a common frame of reference with an offending attorney, but also
because of the nature of the administrative agency structure which combines administrative, investigatory, prosecutorial, decisional, and rule-making functions in one
body and "under one roof."
Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in PracticeBefore the SEC: Disciplinary
Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 25 MEcE L. REv. 637,
641-42 (1974). See generally Cheek, Professional Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the
Securities Lawyer, 23 WASH. & L. L. REv. 598 (1975).
11 See generally Miller, supra note 2, at 55. The evolution was accompanied by a dramatic
increase in the number of disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Commission, from a total of
only five cases prior to 1960 to over 85 cases since 1970. In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp,
SEC Release No. 15,982 (July 8, 1979) [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH 82,124,
at 81,994 (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting).
The change in policy can be attributed to the Commission's
[s]elf-professed inability to protect the financial community from the "monstrous
financial debacles" which had occurred since 1960. The SEC was disturbed by the
growing number of misleading and inaccurate documents accompanying public
offerings that went undetected and led to investor injury. As a result of this post1960 trend, the SEC began to exert pressure through 2(e) hearings upon practitioners
to increase their vigilance in protecting the public interest.
Note, supra note 12, at 439-40. Underlying the Commission's movement away from its traditional philosophy was the realization that "with its small staff, limited resources, and onerous
tasks [the Commission] is peculiarly dependent on the probity and the diligence of the professionals who practice before it." In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973) [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407, at 83,175 n.20, aff'd without opinion, 495
F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Commission therefore concluded that it is "under a duty to
hold our bar to appropriately rigorous standards of professional honor." Id.
" For an excellent discussion of the traditional view of the Commission regarding the
responsibilities and duties of securities lawyers, see Lowenfels, Expanding PublicResponsibilities
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rule 2(e) beyond this limited application. 1 3 The Commission has held
securities lawyers liable for negligence in the performance of their
professional duties,' 4 and has used consent sanctions 15 to have law
firms voluntarily revise their internal operating procedures.' 6 Representative of this trend is the Commission's action against the National
Student Marketing Corp.,'17 where the Commission sought to impose a
standard requiring "whistle-blowing," that is, notifying the Commission of a client's transgressions. ' 8 The district court ultimately did not

of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of
Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 412, 413-18 (1974). Lowenfels pointed out that both the courts and
the Commission had a "traditional reluctance" against imposing sanctions or liabilities on
securities lawyers unless they actively participated in blatant frauds. Id. at 414.
13 See Johnson, supra note 10, at 644. As Johnson pointed out:
As early as 1960, an intent by the Commission to expand the scope of Rule 2(e)
became visible.... In Morris Mac Schwebel [40 SEC 347 (1960), modified, 40 SEC
459 (1961)] the defendant attorney failed, inter alia, to rectify deficient reports filed
with the SEC and was permanently disqualified from practicing before the Commission. The Commission noted that "whether or not respondent intended to facilitate
evasion of the law, his conduct evidenced at least a gross indifference to the observance of legal requirements which an attorney in particular would strive to foster.
[Id. at 371].
Id.
14 See SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L.
Ra.
(CCH) 94,212 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
's A consent sanction is comprised:
of an agreement between the individual practitioner or the practitioner's firm and
the SEC setting forth guidelines and standards proposed by the SEC as a means for
the professional or firm to upgrade disclosure procedures and avoid future misrepresentations. The consent sanction set[s] forth the desired levels of future conduct for
the securities practitioner.
Note, supra note 10, at 440.
18 See In re Keating, Muething & Klikamp, SEC Release No. 15982
July 2, 1979) [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,164. Regarding the Commission's policy toward
accounting firms, Miller questions whether the true intent of the Commission is "to subjugate the
accounting profession to the Commission's day-to-day control." Miller, supra note 2, at 68.
11 The Commission's complaint was against National Student Marketing Corp. and numerous other defendants including four individual attorneys and two distinguished law firms. It
resulted in numerous reported opinions, e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 430 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.
1977); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157 (D.D.C. 1975), aft'd, 538 F.2d
404 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977).
18 The charges against Student Marketing Corp. derived:
from the merger between NSMC [National Student Marketing Corporation] and
Interstate National Corp., in which the Interstate shareholders exchanged their
shares for approximately 1,650,000 shares of NSMC stock. Just before the merger
closing, NSMC's accountants submitted a "comfort" letter to counsel for both parties
that adjusted NSMC's nine months' earnings downward by $784,000 and converted
a reported $700,000 profit into a net loss. Counsel for both parties declined to insist
that the contents of this letter be publicized, declined to insist that Interstate's
shareholders (whose approval of the merger had been solicited based on the erroneous profit report) be resolicited, and proceeded to consummate the merger. Imme-
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endorse the whistle-blowing standard, 9 but instead held that securiclients regarding
ties attorneys have a duty to "speak out" to 2their
0
non-compliance with disclosure requirements.
Although there has been some judicial support for the Commission's negligence standard, 21 such support came prior to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder22 and Aaron v.
SEC,2 3 which require scienter 24 in both damage actions 25 and suits for
injunctive relief26 under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 193427 and Rule 10b-5 21 promulgated thereunder. After Hocha lawyer knowingly violated the
Jelder and Aaron, a showing that
29
securities laws may be required.
Perhaps because of the lack of total endorsement of its objectives
by the judiciary, the Commission took the opportunity in In re Carter
to enunciate its standard for professional conduct-a standard less
extreme than the previously proposed whistle-blowing duty. 30 The
diately following the closing, 77,000 shares of NSMC common stock were publicly
sold by former Interstate directors for $1,900,000.
Lowenfels, supra note 11, at 420. For a thorough discussion of the major issues raised by the
NSMC action see Patterson, The Limits of the Lawyer's Discretion and the Law of Legal Ethics:
National Student Marketing Revisited, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1251.
1 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 714-15, 715 n.74 (D.D.C.
1978).
20 Id. at 713.
21 See SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
22 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
23 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
14 Scienter was broadly defined in Hochfelder as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud." 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. As regards the application of the scienter
requirement to professionals in the securities field, some jurisdictions hold that reckless conduct
satisfies the requirement and that the plaintiff can use circumstantial evidence to show that the
professional-defendant did not have a genuine belief that the disclosed information was complete
and accurate. See McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
05 425 U.S. at 193.
06 446 U.S. at 695. The court also held that scienter is a necessary element in injunctive
actions under § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1977), but not under §
17(a)(2)(3). 446 U.S. at 697.
27 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1977).
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
09 It should be noted that the standard of culpability in tender offer cases under § 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1977), has not been definitively determined.
See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 425 U.S. 910 (1977) and the case it overruled on other
grounds, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
' The Commission made it clear that it was not at this time deciding whether whistle-blowing would be required: "This case does not involve, nor do we here deal with, the additional
question of when a lawyer, aware of his client's intention to commit fraud or an illegal act, has a
professional duty to disclose that fact either publicly or to an affected third party." In re Carter,
[Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,173 n.78 (emphasis added). The Commission
did suggest, however, that "other existing standards of professional conduct" might require
whistle-blowing. Id. The Commission cited as an example DR 7-102(B) of the ABA Code of
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National Telephone Company, Inc. (National) leased sophisticated
telephone equipment systems to commercial customers and exhibited
an impressive growth rate.3 1 National incurred the bulk of its expenses, including equipment, marketing, and installation costs, well
before it realized any income from rental payments. Therefore, the
company's cash-flow situation worsened with each new transaction. 32 By 1974, continued growth could only occur through extensive external financing. A consortium of five banks agreed to lend
33
National a total of $21 million.
In view of National's strained financial condition, however, they
insisted upon the proviso that the final $2 million of the loan package
would only become available upon the execution of a special Lease
Maintenance Plan (LMP), which would drastically convert National
from a fast-growing, highly expanding corporation to essentially a
non-growth, maintenance company. 34 The LMP would be triggered

Professional Responsibility. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REv. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84,173 n.78.
Although this disciplinary rule does have a whistle-blowing requirement, it does not deal with
the intention to commit fraud but with past acts of a client: "A lawyer who receives information
clearly establishing that .. .[h]is
client has . . . perpetrateda fraud . ..shall reveal the fraud
to the affected person or tribunal .. " ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7,
DR 7-102(B)(1) (1977) (emphasis added). Moreover, the final clause of the disciplinary rule
provides an important exception to the whistle-blowing requirement "when the information is
protected as a privileged communication." Id. Under certain circumstances this clause may in
effect "prevent the lawyer from making the disclosures required by DR 7-102(B)." The Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law Practice-A Report by the Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, 30 Bus. LAW. 1289,
1296 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report by Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability].
DR 4-101(C)(3) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility addresses a client's intention
to commit an illegal act. In such a situation the rule does not mandate disclosure but leaves it up
to the attorney's discretion: "A lawyer may reveal .. .[t]he intention of his client to commit a
crime ....
"' ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4, DR 4-101(C)(3) (1977)
(emphasis added). For a general discussion of the issues raised by these disciplinary rules, see
Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-The Lawyer's Dilemma, 33
Bus. LAW. 1389 (1978); Report by Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, supra.
Hoffman takes the position that in certain circumstances the term "may" in DR 4-101(C)(3)
should be interpreted to mean "must," thereby requiring whistle-blowing. Hoffman, supra at
1410. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965).
31 In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,151.
32 Id.
33Id. at 84,159. The five banks in the consortium were: Bankers Trust Company of New
York; Mellon Bank N.A. of Pittsburgh; Central National Bank of Cleveland; The Connecticut
Bank & Trust Company; and the Hartford National Bank & Trust Company of Hartford,
Connecticut. Id. at 84,160. Of the $21 million loan, approximately $16.5 million, was used to
repay short-term loans to the very same lending banks. Id. at 84,159-60.
34 Id. at 84,158-59. The Commission pointed out that "one expert . . .testified that the
LMP was 'a sort of holding pattern short of bankruptcy or levy action by the creditors.' The LMP
required National to terminate all sales activities, dismiss all sales personnel and limit its
operation to those necessary to service existing leases." Id.
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when National either attempted to borrow part or all of the final $2
million or failed to meet a specified liquidity test. 35 Once having
borrowed the final amount, moreover, National could only use it to
change its character from a growth to a non-growth enterprise, as
mandated by the LMP."8
Because the majority of the loan was used to pay existing debts,37
National was in need of additional external financing. From mid-1974
to mid-1975 National was not successful in obtaining the needed
financing, 38 and thus the likelihood of implementation of the LMP
increased. Nonetheless, National's management, and in particular its
chief executive officer Sheldon L. Hart, persisted in not disclosing the
full terms of the LMP19 in its filings with the Commission, 40 and
issued optimistic letters to its shareholders 4 I as well as a very encouraging press release. 42 Thus National's true economic position contin43
ued to be withheld from the public.
William R. Carter and Charles J. Johnson, Jr., partners in the
law firm of Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell & Petty, rendered legal
services to National during 1974 and 1975 . 4 The Commission re11Id. at

84,158.
Id. at 84,159.
11 See id. at 84,158.
3 Id. at 84,154, 84,157. National explored several alternatives, namely, a proposed public
offering of common stock which never materialized due to "the deteriorating public equity
markets of the day," id. at 84,154, a sale of $1 million worth of common stock to one of its
suppliers, id. at 84,157, the establishment of a regional bank program through which local banks
would provide financing secured by new equipment leases, and a possible public offering of its
debentures. Id.
'9 Disclosure was important, for the Commission pointed out that "[a~ll the witnesses speaking to the question agreed that the term 'lease maintenance plan' had no generally accepted
meaning in the industry and that they had never used or heard that term before." Id. at 84,158.
10 Id. at 84,158, 84,160, 84,162. The filings included a quarterly report "for the second fiscal
quarter ended September 30, 1974" filed in December 1974, id. at 84,158, a Form 8-K current
report covering the month of December 1974, which was filed on January 9, 1975, id. at 84,160,
and an amendment to the Form 8-K current report for December 1974, which was filed on April
21, 1975. Id. at 84,162.
11 Id. at 84,155, 84,156, 84,160. The first was issued on or about June 18, 1974 in which a
3 % stock dividend was announced. Id. at 84,155. The remaining stockholder letters were issued
on August 19 (declaring two more 1% stock dividends), id.; on September 12 (stating that
"August had been 'an outstanding month' "), id. at 84,156; and on December 23 (indicating that
National "was stronger now than ever before in its history"). Id. at 84,160.
42 Id. at 84,156. The press release was issued on October 17, 1974. Id.
, Id. When public disclosure of National's financial crisis was ultimately made in May 1975
the market for the company's stock plumeted and bankruptcy proceedings were initiated several
months later. Id. at 84,164.
'4 Id. at 84,152-53. An associate of the firm, Kenneth M. Socha, also worked with Carter
and Johnson in all the matters addressed in the proceeding but he was not named as a respondent. Id. at 84,152 & n.31. The services included, inter alia, "the preparation of a form S-8
registration statement, proxy materials, other SEC filings, press releases and communications to
National's stockholders." Id. at 84,153.
3
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viewed their activities during the period of National's uncertain financial future. In its detailed chronological presentation of the events
from May 1974 to May 1975, the Commission emphasized that despite
the attorneys' actual and inferred knowledge regarding Hart's unwillingness to comply with the disclosure requirements of the securities
laws and the widening gap between the company's actual financial
condition and its public posture, the attorneys took little or no effective action to insure that Hart satisfied statutory disclosure requirements.4 5 When National failed to issue a more candid and objective
46
stockholder letter neither Carter nor Johnson pursued the matter.
Also, they did not discuss with National the disclosure deficiencies of a
quarterly report issued by National even though they had an opportunity to review a draft prior to its release. 47 Furthermore, Carter did
not discuss the precise effects of the LMP in a press release he drafted
which announced the closing of the loan agreement between National
and the five banks.4 8 Finally, when an opportunity arose to advise
Hart to publicize the terms of the LMP, Carter instead provided
advice which allowed Hart to avoid its publication. 4 The advice
resulted in a current report being filed with the Commission, which
Carter had full responsibility for preparing and which did not discuss
clearly the potential impact of the LMP. 50 In particular, the report
failed to reveal that implementation of the LMP would abruptly
change National from a growth to a non-growth company.5 '
The Commission pointed out that even after Carter and Johnson's firm was notified by the bank's counsel 52 that the LMP had been
triggered, Carter and Johnson did not persist in verifying this occur45

Id. at 84,153-64.

Id. at 84,157.
Id. at 84,158. The report was filed in December 1974. See note 39 supra.
48 In re Carter, [Current] FEo. Sac. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,160. The Commission
emphasized that:
[T]he press release did not discuss either of the following matters, each of which was
then within the knowledge of Carter and Johnson.
(1) The precise nature and effects on National's business of the LMP and the
likelihood that National would be required to implement the LMP within a short
period of time; and
(2) The substantial limitations placed on National's operations by the [loan
agreement].
Id.
d4Id. at 84,159. If the LMP was an exhibit to the loan agreement, filing of the LMP with the
Commission would be required. However, Carter advised that if instead the LMP was merely
referred to, filing would not be necessary and publication would be avoided. Hart then did not
include the LMP as an exhibit. Id.
Id. at 84,160-61. This was a Form 8-K current report filed on January 9, 1975. See note 40
supra.
5l In re Carter, [Current] FaD. SEc. L. REaP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,158-59.
51 Id. at 84,161.
46
47
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rence, even though Carter admitted that a triggering of the LMP was
clearly a material event requiring disclosure. 53 Subsequent to this,
moreover, Carter participated in another filing with the Commission
which contained no discussion of the LMP and its effects.54
Carter and Johnson eventually met with Hart and strongly counseled that disclosure of the triggering of the LMP was immediately
required.55 Not only did Hart fail to heed this advice, but he attempted to have Johnson render a legal opinion for the lending banks
to the effect that disclosure was not required.56 Johnson would not
issue such an opinion. 57 Furthermore, Johnson had a proposed disclosure document drafted for inclusion in National's next filing with the
Commission. When National did not issue the disclosure document,
58
however, neither Carter nor Johnson pursued this matter.
An administrative law judge found the activities of Carter and
Johnson sufficient to qualify as willful aiding and abetting under rule
2(e)(iii) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, and as unethical and improper
professional conduct under rule 2(e)(ii). 59 Accordingly, Carter and
Johnson were suspended from practicing or appearing before the
Commission for one year and nine months, respectively.6 0 On appeal, the Commission, after concluding that it possesses the requisite
jurisdictional grant of authority to promulgate and apply rule 2(e), 6'
Id. at 84,162.
Id. This was an amendment to the Form 8-K current report; the amendment was filed on
April 21, 1975. See note 40 supra.
s'In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,162.
Id. at 84,162-63.
"

57 Id.

M Id. at 84,163.
59 Id. at 84,146, 84,164 n.j. Carter and Johnson were found to have aided and abetted
violations of section 10(b) (catchall antifraud provision making it unlawful in connection with
sale or purchase of any security to employ any deceptive or manipulative devise in violation of
Commission rules promulgated under section 10(b)) and section 13(a) (requires filing of periodic
reports with Commission, such as annual and quarterly reports) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and rules 10b-5 (catchall antifraud rule promulgated under section 10(b)), 12b-20
(requires inclusion of all material information, even if not expressly asked for, in filings with
Commission), and 13a-11 (requires filing of current reports with Commission) promulgated
thereunder. In re Carter, [Current] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,146, 84,164 n.j.
e In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,146, 84,164 n.1. The
administrative law judge reached his conclusions using the "clear and convincing evidence
standard." Id. at 84,146 n.3. Shortly before the Commission's decision was issued, the Supreme
Court held in Steadman v. SEC, 101 S. Ct. 999, 1008-09 (1981), that in administrative proceedings the standard of proof is a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Id. The Commission
concluded that its decision in this matter would be the same under either standard. Id.
61
In re Carter, [Current] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,147. Carter and Johnson
raised four major grounds in challenging the Commission's authority to promulgate rule 2(e):
1. The Commission was not given the express authority to adopt Rule 2 (e) and
in the comprehensive scheme of the federal securities law it is inappropriate to imply
a power not expressly given.
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reversed both findings. 62 The Commission did, however, comment
that the conduct of Carter and Johnson raised serious concerns about
6 3
the obligations of securities attorneys rendering disclosure advice.
2. The Administrative Practice Act, 5 U.S.C. 500, precludes the adoption or
exercise of powers under Rule 2(e) because that amounts to a de facto establishment
of a specialized SEC bar, which is expressly forbidden by the statute.
3. As a matter of policy, it is inappropriate for an agency with prosecutorial
responsibilities to exercise disciplinary authority over counsel who renders advice to
regulated entities.
4. The implications of the Commission's exercise of authority under Rule 2(e)
are so vast that it effectively regulates the relationship between a lawyer and his
client, the public and the government; and, as an administrative body with expertise
in a particular area, the Commission has neither the wisdom nor the mandate to
engage in such regulation.
Id. at 84,146-47. The Commission considered and rejected each of these arguments. Id. at
84,147-49. As to a lack of authority to adopt rule 2(e), the Commission emphasized that of the
numerous courts which have considered the question, none have ruled that the Commission did
not have the requisite authority. Id. at 84,147. It is important to note, however, that it was only
recently, in Touche Ross v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979), that a court for the first time
directly validated the statutory authority of the Commission to adopt rule 2(e). See Note, supra
note 10.
In discussing the Administrative Practice Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1970), the Commission
considered the purpose of the Act, which was viewed to be the elimination of "agency-established admission requirements," and its legislative history, which, according to the Commission,
"'makes clear that Congress ... did not intend . ..to affect or delimit the existing disciplinary
authority of federal agencies." In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,847, at
84,148.
The Commission recognized the potential for abuse that can occur when an administrative
agency with prosecutorial responsibilities has disciplinary power over the attorneys appearing
before it. Id. In the light of the need to preserve the integrity of its processes and the "substantial
internal safeguards" which it has established, the Commission reasoned that it has an obligation
to use rule 2(e) in appropriate circumstances. Id. See In re Keating, Meuthing & Klekamp, SEC
Release No. 15982 (July 2, 1979) [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at
81,991-92 (Williams, Chairman, concurring). But see id. at 81,993-95 (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting).
Finally, the Commission concluded that the subject area of the instant case-the performance by securities lawyers of "disclosure-related professional services"--is an area within its
responsibility and expertise. In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847, at
84,148-49. See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
02 In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,173. In reversing the
finding that Carter and Johnson willfully aided and abetted violations of the securities laws, the
Commission set out the three elements it deems necessary for liability as an aider and abettor:
"1. there exists an independent securities law violation committed by some other party; 2. the
aider and abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the conduct that constitutes the violation;
and 3. the aider and abettor was aware or knew that his role was part of an activity that was
improper or illegal." Id. at 84,166. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94-95
(5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975). For an excellent discussion of aiding and abetting liability in securities cases see Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari
Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 621-44 (1972).
The Commission found that Carter's and Johnson's activities easily satisfied the first two
elements of the test for aiding and abetting. In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,166. In applying the third element to the instant facts, the Commission focused on
the December press release redrafted by Carter and the January Commission filing prepared by
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In reversing the administrative law judge's finding that Carter
and Johnson had engaged in unethical and unprofessional conduct,
the Commission agreed with the contention that it would be unfair to
retroactively impose new rules of conduct.6 4 The Commission, on the
other hand, did hold that it is reasonable to require professionals
practicing before it to satisfy "generally recognized norms of professional conduct, whether or not such norms had previously been explicitly adopted or endorsed.- 65 The Commission reasoned, however,
that securities lawyers cannot be held to generally recognized norms
in situations where an attorney learns that his client is violating the
securities laws since such norms have not been unambiguously established. 66 In the future there will be considerably less uncertainty,
Carter, see notes 49 & 50 supra and accompanying text, as well as Carter's and Johnson's
inaction and silence with regard to National's noncompliance with the disclosure requirements of
the securities laws. In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,167-69. The
Commission held that, in the absence of direct evidence of Carter's awareness that the details of
the LMP were material, the evidence was not sufficient to support the conclusion that Carter
was a willful aider and abettor because of his participation in the press release and Commission
filing. Id. at 84,168. Furthermore, the record of Carter's and Johnson's silence and inaction was
especially inadequate to establish liability since a higher level of intent is required in such
circumstances. Id. at 84,168-69. See Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhodes, 527 F.2d 880, 889 (3d Cir.
1975) (deliberate intent to assist illegal conduct by silence or inaction required); Strong v.
France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973) (for silence or inaction to be wrongful, duty to aid or
disclose required).
Commissioner Evans vigorously disagreed with the majority's finding on Carter's liability
with respect to the press release and Commission filing, arguing that the facts were clearly
sufficient to "demand" the inference that Carter had the requisite mental state to be liable as an
aider and abettor. In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,174 (Evans,
Comm'r, concurring and dissenting). The Commissioner found "most troubling" the reluctance
to draw "reasonable inferences" regarding Carter's "culpable mental state." Id.
63 Id. at 84,170.
Id. at 84,169-70.
65 Id. at 84,170. The Commission cited as an example of such a generally recognized norm
DR 6-101 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, id. at 84,170 n.64, which prescribes
that "[a] lawyer shall not ... [h]andle a legal matter . . . that he is not competent to
handle . . .[or] without preparation adequate in the circumstances .. .[or] neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 6, DR 6101(A)(1)-(3) (1977) (emphasis added).
In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,170. The Commission did
discuss two ABA disciplinary rules which it believed "to be of such a fundamental nature that [it]
would not hesitate to hold that their coverage plainly falls within the area of conduct prohibited
by Rule 2(e)(1)(ii)." Id. at 84,170 n.65. The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a]
lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in illegal conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) (1977). It also
provides that -a lawyer shall not .. .[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent." Id. DR 7-102(A)(7). The Commission decided not to apply
these rules in the instant proceeding for two reasons:
First, it is unclear whether the operative terms used in these Disciplinary Rules are
coextensive with the use of such terms in the statutory prohibition of Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act. Second, it is not apparent that the reach of ABA DR 1-102(A)(4)
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though not total clarity, since the Commission promulgated a standard for professional conduct in its opinion.
Beginning with what it characterized as "considerable acceptance" of the principle that the discharge of professional responsibilities requires that an attorney make all reasonable efforts to persuade a
client to adhere to legal mandates,6 7 the Commission set out its standard for ethical and proper professional conduct, containing four major elements:
When a lawyer [1] with significant responsibilitiesin the effectua-

tion of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws [2] becomes aware [3] that his client is
engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those

disclosure requirements, [4] his continued participation violates
professional standards unless he takes prompt steps to end the
client's noncompliance. 8
Although the standard applied only to lawyers with significant
9 the Commission
responsibilities,"
included in this group all securities
lawyers who actively participate in a company's ongoing disclosure
program, 70 thus making this a very broad category. The basis for such
an all-encompassing categorization is the Commission's view that such
attorneys are "often involved on an intimate, day-to-day basis in the
judgments that determine what will be disclosed and what will be
withheld from the public markets." ' 71 This same viewpoint also underlies the Commission's reasoning that "[w]hen a lawyer serving in
such a capacity concludes that his client's disclosures are not adequate
to comply with the law . . .he is 'aware,' in a literal sense, of a
72
continuing violation of the securities laws.

The Commission emphasized that the standard primarily applies
only when there is a substantial and continuing noncompliance with
disclosure requirements and does not apply to every isolated act which
the attorney believes to be a failure to comply. 73 The Commission
or 7-102(A)(7) is greater or any different from the reach of Rule 2(e)(1)(ii) in the case
of a lawyer who willfully aids and abets a violation of Section 10(b).
In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,170 n.65. See note 30 supra. But
see Okin, Responsibilitiesof CorporateCounsel to Third Parties, 54 CONN. B. J. 291, 294 (1980),
where the author discusses the first level decision on Carter's and Johnson's activities and
concludes that "[e]ven on the most restricted reading of the present Code of Professional
Responsibility ... Carter and Johnson surely had an obligation to do more than they did." Id.
67 In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,170.
68 Id. at 84,172 (emphasis added).
69 Id.

70 Id. at 84,171.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 84,172.
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hastened to add, however, that even isolated disclosure failures are
not precluded if they "are so serious that their correction becomes a
''r
matter of primary professional concern. 7
What is likely to be considered the most controversial aspect of
the standard is the requirement that securities lawyers take prompt
action to end the noncompliance of the client. 75 It is important to
understand that the underlying premise for the prompt action requirement is the Commission's proposition that the client is the entity,
that is, the corporation itself is the client, and not the management or
other individuals associated with the corporation.7 6 Proceeding from
this perspective, the Commission listed several "suggested" affirmative
steps for securities lawyers. When faced with a non-complying management the attorney is advised to consider: a direct approach to
either the full board of directors or one or more individual directors or
officers; procurement of the assistance of other members of the management; or resignation. 7 Furthermore, the Commission indicated
Id.
Id.
76 Id. at 84,171. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility similarly provides: "A lawyer
employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not
to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the
entity." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5, EC 5-18 (1977). See Lane v.
Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385 (8th Cir. 1979), where the court held that "attorneys representing a
corporation serve in the same fiduciary capacity as the directors." Id. at 1389.
Rule 1.13 of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct makes the point clearer: "A
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization as distinct from its
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents." ABA COMM. ON
EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, rule 1.13
(1980) (Discussion draft), reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 1 (Feb. 19, 1980) (special edition) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT]. The proposed
rule 1.13 has been the focus of much commentary. For favorable comments, see Kutak, The
Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some ObservationsAbout the Proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 30 CATH. U. L. REv. 1 (1980); Redlick, Disclosure Provisions of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 1980 ABF RES. J. 981 (1980). For critical remarks, see Elliot, The
Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Invention Not Mothered by Necessity?, 54
CONN. B. J. 265 (1980); Okin, Responsibilities of CorporateCounsel to Third Parties, 54 CONN.
B. J. 291 (1980).
77 In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,172. Rule 1.13(c) of the
Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct goes even further; it has a whistle-blowing feature that
allows an attorney under certain circumstances to disclose clients' confidences. PROPOSED MODEL
74
75

RULES

OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,

supra note 76, at rule 1.13(c). The thrust of rule 1.13, as well

as a succinct summary thereof, is found in Patterson, An Analysis of the ProposedModel Rules of
Professional Conduct, 31 MEcE L. REv. 645, 660-61 (1980):
The lawyer's problem is to determine what to do if his fellow agents engage in
unlawful conduct which is likely to result in significant harm to the organization.
Rule 1.13 recognizes the authority, indeed, the duty, of the lawyer to take appropriate measure [sic] to prevent the harm. Thus, if the lawyer knows that a person
associated with the organization is engaged in illegal conduct which is likely to result
in significant harm to the organization, the lawyer must use reasonable efforts to
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that resignation should really be left as a last resort since "[p]remature
resignation serves neither the end of an effective lawyer-client relationship nor, in most cases, the effective administration of the securi78
ties laws.'
The Commission stressed, however, that once an attorney passes
the "critical juncture" where he concludes that his client is not heeding his advice and has embarked upon a course of continuing noncompliance,79 "[w]hat is required . . .is some prompt action that leads to
the conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the
underlying problem, rather than having capitulated to the desires of a
strong-willed, but misguided client." 80
The Commission did not specifically define what constitutes
"prompt action," and merely indicated that it would depend in
each
case on the situation facing the lawyer. 81 Likewise, after stating that
the attorneys' efforts to have the client comply need not necessarily be
successful, 82 the Commission failed to give any specific criteria for
judging the acceptability of an attorney's action. Rather, the Commission posited that the actions "must be considered in the light of all
relevant surrounding circumstances, "83 and set out a broad guideline
encompassing both a good faith test and a reasonable efforts criterion:
"[s]o long as a lawyer is acting in good faith and exerting reasonable
efforts to prevent violations of the law by his client, his professional
84
obligations have been met.
Viewing the activities of National's management as an attempt to
pervert the normal lawyer-client relationship, 85 the Commission
prevent the harm . . . The measures taken must be designed to minimize disruption and the risk of disclosing confidences. These measures may include asking for
reconsideration of the matter, [Rule 1.13(b)(1)], seeking a separate legal opinion for
presentation to the appropriate authority in the organization [1.13(b)(2)], and referring the matter to the highest authority which can act for the organization
[1.13(b)(3)]. If these measures fail, the lawyer may take further remedial action,
including the disclosure of confidences to the extent necessary, if the lawyer reasonably believes that action is in the best interests of the organization [ 1.13(c)].
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the disclosure of client confidences is a last resort. It should be noted
that rule 1.13 does not offer the alternative of resignation, unless the term "further remedial
action" of 1.13(c) is meant to include such a course of action. But such a construction would only
be consistent with the thrust of rule 1.13 if resignation was indeed a "remedial action," that is,
likely to be viewed as a reasonable effort to prevent the harm. See note 76 supra.
78 In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,172.
79 Id.
0 Id.
1 Id. at 84,172 n.77.
82

Id.

83

Id.

Id. at 84,172-73.
Is Id. at 84,172.
8
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strongly implied that Carter and Johnson did not meet its newly
promulgated standard since an attorney must "do . . .more than
stubbornly continue to suggest disclosure when he knows his suggestions are falling on deaf ears." ' Having decided to apply its standard
only prospectively,8 7 however, the Commission did not hold Carter
and Johnson liable;8 8 but the Commission did give notice to all securities lawyers that it will apply the standard to all future proceedings
where a violation of subparagraph (ii) of rule 2(e)(1) is alleged.8 9
The standard presented by the Commission" is certainly consistent with its modern philosophy of relying on the securities bar to, in
effect, be its police force. 9 ' Critics of this practice emphasize that it
will deter corporate executives from presenting problems to an attorney 92 and will cause securities lawyers to become overly concerned
with their own potential liabilities, thereby resulting in a lack of
zealous representation of their corporate clients. 93 At the heart of the
controversy lies the grave concern over the prior attempts by the
Commission to impose a whistle-blowing requirement. 94 By not including this requirement in its standard, 5 the Commission reduces the
"

86

Id.

87

Id.

at 84,146.

88 Id.
88 Id.

at 84,173.

9' Id. at 84,172. It is not totally clear why the Commission felt it necessary to promulgate the
standard in an administrative proceeding. As the dissent astutely pointed out, such a course of
action denied prior input not only to the public, but also to key personnel within the Commission, such as its General Counsel and operating division. Id. at 84,177-78 (Evans, Comm'r,
concurring and dissenting). Although the Commission did state that it would issue a subsequent
release in which comments from the public would be solicited. Id. at 84,170, there seems to be
no convincing justification for not using such a release as a first step rather than as an afterthought.
"' See note 11 supra. As former Commissioner Sommer remarked in a widely publicized
speech: "the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to that of the auditor than to
that of the advocate." Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer [19731974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,631, at 83,689 (Jan. 1974).
82 See Elliot, supra note 76, at 276; Lowenfels, supra note 11, at 435.
93 See Johnson, supra note 10, at 660.
14 See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra. For example, one commentator, after stressing
that lawyers are fiduciaries of their clients, went on to caution that "[t]he Commission's effort to
substitute itself, or the public, as the lawyer's true client would prevent the profession from
acting as it is expected to and would thereby undermine the influence of lawyers on their clients
and in the long run would discredit the disclosure process itself." Cooney, The Registration
Process: The Role of the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33 Bus. LAW. 1329, 1334 (1978).
Gs National had a number of outside directors who had the potential to, and ultimately did,
take effective action to make the necessary statutory disclosure. In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,164. Whether the standard will also apply to situations where no
independent board exists is not totally ascertainable from the Commission's opinion. The inclusion, however, of resignation as the final course of action by an attorney, id. at 84,172, suggests
that the standard will have universal application.
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scope of the controversy to the narrower issue of whether securities
lawyers, in addition to the requisite ethical responsibilities for ensuring that a client complies with legal mandates, 9 ought to be subject to
a separate Commission standard as well. In light of the importance of
the disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange Acts of
193397 and 1934,98 duly recognized by the judiciary, 99 and the Commission's admission that it is unable, on its own, to adequately monitor compliance with the disclosure requirements, 0 0 the placing of a
reasonable duty on securities lawyers does not seem overly burdensome or likely to disrupt the attorney-client relationship. The key
inquiry is whether the standard set forth is indeed reasonable, for if it
proves not to be it could cause a degree of disruption that might
ultimately impair the disclosure process.
The Commission's standard 10 ' is well-reasoned and does not
place an unfair burden on securities lawyers. Although it is designed
to bring many practicing securities lawyers within its application, 102 it
is generally limited to situations where an attorney knows that his
client is engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to make the
proper disclosures,10 3 which was clearly the situation in the instant
case. 104 As for the degree of knowledge that will be required to satisfy
the awareness element of the standard, the Commission has not directly addressed this issue. The Commission's high threshold requirement to infer knowledge for aiding and abetting liability, 0 5 however,
especially when silence or inaction are involved, 06 is indicative that a
similarly high criterion will be used to determine whether the knowledge requirement of its ethical standard has been satisfied.
The burden of establishing that some prompt action has been
taken should not prove to be a difficult undertaking. An attorney will
usually keep copies of memoranda in which he counsels the degree of
disclosure necessary for statutory compliance, as well as drafts of

11 See notes 30, 66, 67 & 76 supra and accompanying text.
11 Sections 1-328 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbb (1977).
11 Sections 1-35 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1977).
99 See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195; SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180,
197-99 (1963).
100 See note 11 supra.
101See text accompanying note 68 supra.
102 See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
103See text accompanying note 68 supra.
104 See text accompanying notes
effect, Carter and Johnson would
85-86 supra.
105In re Carter, [Current] FED.
l06 In re Carter, [Current] FaD.

44-58 supra. Had the Commission's standard already been in
have likely been found liable. See text accompanying notes
SEc. L. RaP. (CCH)
SEc. L. RaP. (CCH)

82,847, 84,167. See note 62 supra.
82,847, 84,169. See note 62 supra.
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disclosure documents he has prepared. A series of such memoranda
addressed to the appropriate people in the chain of command of the
client system, up to and including the board of directors, should be
more than adequate to satisfy the good-faith test 0 7 which the Commission established. There is some uncertainty in this area, however,
since the Commission did not define what it means by "prompt
action," an omission which the securities bar is certain to consider
material. In making its good-faith test very liberal,10 8 the Commission
does offer some comfort to securities lawyers.
The Commission appropriately has stressed that an attorney's
resignation should be considered only as a last resort. 109 Resignation
is a more powerful device than most attorneys realize" 10 since it may
well lead to statutory compliance by the client. The decision to resign
should only be reached after a careful consideration of its negative
impact on the client and a balancing of the weight of the conflicting
effects. To do less would be unethical since a lawyer "owes his allegiance" to his client."'
The definition of the client as the corporate entity,1 2 and the
confinement of the standard to activities within the client system,"'
avoid the complex issues which arise when disclosures violate client
confidences." 4 Furthermore, the definition of client is consistent
with the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity."' '1 The entire
standard, moreover, complements the duties that the Code of Professional Responsibility presently impose: a lawyer is prohibited from
engaging in fraud"" or from assisting his client in behavior "that the
107

See text accompanying note 84 supra.

108 See text accompanying note 84 supra.

1o See text accompanying note 78 supra.
110 As one commentator pointed out:
Directors will rarely act contrary to firm legal advice, and they will certainly think
again if their lawyers show a willingness to resign when their advice is declined.
They will think again not only because of the potential public consequences if the
resignation becomes generally known, but also because most managements genuinely respect the judgment and character of their counsel, and are bound to be
impressed by the courage and conviction that a decision to resign involves.
Cutler, The Role of the Private Law Firm, 33 Bus. LAW. 1549, 1557 (1978).
1 See note 76 supra.
112 In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,171. See note 76 supra
and accompanying text.
113 In re Carter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REPi. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,172. See note 77 supra
and accompanying text.
"4 See notes 76 & 77 supra. But see Elliot, supra note 76, at 276-77.
15 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RzSPONSIBILIn, Canon 3, EC 5-18 (1977). See note 76 supra.
16 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) (1977); note 66
supra.
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lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent;" 117 "[a] lawyer may reveal . . . [t]he intention of his client to commit a crime;"" 8 and a
lawyer is required to disclose non-privileged information "clearly establishing that . . . [h]is client has . . . perpetrated a fraud." 119 Also,
the standard parallels rule 1.13 of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 20 although it does not go as far as rule 1.13,121 which
allows the disclosure of client confidences when there is a clear "violation of law [which] . . . is likely to result in substantial injury to the
1 22
organization."
In conclusion, the ethical standard enacted by the Commission in
In re Carter, if judiciously applied, will not present a severe intrusion
into the attorney-client relationship or present an unreasonable burden on the securities bar. The remarks of a former president of the
American Bar Association perhaps best capture what can reasonably
be expected of a securities lawyer:
The lawyer representing business today, if he is to live up to his
new responsibilities, will endeavor to avoid the errors of the past;
he will shun advice that is motivated by a desire to preserve the
rubrics of a vanished era; he will be alive to the social, economic,
and political implications of the time; he will avoid a narrow,
short-sighted approach to his clients' problems; he will have the
courage to advise against a business program or device that, although legally defensible, is in conflict with the basic principles of
ethics. Failing these, he not only will be ignoring his obligations to
society but will be doing a disservice to his client. That client may
find itself in the position of winning a legal battle but losing a social
war. 123
Joseph R. D'Amore

"i
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
supra.
1 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY,

RESPONSIBILITY,

Canon 7, DR 7-102(A)(7) (1977). See note 66

Canon 4, DR 4-101(C)(3) (1977).

"l Id. Canon 7, DR 7-102(B)(1).
120 PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,

121

supra note 76, at Rule 1.13(c).
Gossett, The CorporationLawyer's Social Responsibilities,60 A.B.A.J. 1517, 1519 (1974).

122 PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
113

supra note 76, at rule 1.13(c).

See note 77 supra.

